Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries by Adler, Jonathan H.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2002 
Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries 
Jonathan H. Adler 
Case Western University School of Law, jonathan.adler@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Adler, Jonathan H., "Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering in Marine Fisheries" (2002). Faculty Publications. 
265. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/265 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
Legal Obstacles to Private Ordering 
in Marine Fisheries 
Jonathan H. Adler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The overall state of the world's fisheries is much worse today 
than 45 years ago, even though most fisheries have come 
under government regulation in this period. 1 
Fisheries worldwide are in decline. Overfishing and poor 
management have left numerous fish species in trouble. It is esti­
mated that almost one-half of global fish stocks are fully exploited 
and approximately twenty-two percent are over-exploited. 2 Even 
those who otherwise question tales of environmental ruin acknowl­
edge the plight of the world's marine resources.3 The United 
Assistant Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. This paper 
was prepared for the National Fisheries Law and Policy Symposium at Roger Wil­
liams University Ralph R. Papitto School of Law, June 28, 2002. The author would 
like to thank Jonathan Entin, Bishop Grewell, Erik Jensen, Andrew Morriss, 
Craig Nard , and Katrina Wyman for their comments on earlier drafts of this pa­
per. Any errors or omissions remain those of the author. 
1. Ralph Townsend, Producer Organizations and Agreem~nts in Fisherie,,: 
Integrating Regulation and Coasian Bargaining 222 (Jan. 2002) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) (prepared for the Political Economy Research 
Center's (PERC) Thirteenth Political Economy Forum "Evolving Property Rights 
in Marine Fisheries" at Big Sky, Montana). 
2. Louis W. Botsford et aI., The Management ofFisheries and Marine Ecosys­
tems, 277 SCI. 509, 509-10 (1997) (citing estimates of the American Fisheries Soci­
ety that forty-four percent of fish stocks are "fully to heavily exploited," sixteen 
percent are "over-exploited," and six percent are "depleted"). Of additional concern 
is that fishery landings have shifted "down" the food web from larger fish to 
smaller fish and invertebrates, suggesting that existing catch levels are unsustain­
able. Sec Daniel Pauly et aI., Fishing Down Marine Food Webs, 279 SeT. 860, 860 
(1998); see also J.F. Caddy et a!., How Pervasive Is "Fishing Down Marine Food 
Webs?," 282 SCI. 1383a (1998); Daniel Pauly et aI., Response (1998), at http:// 
www.sciencemag.org/cgilcontentifulV282/5393/1383a (on file with author). 
3. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Prologue: Environmentalism for the Twenty-First 
Century , in Tm; TRUE STATE OF THl> PLANET 4 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995); see also 
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States is no exception. The National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS) identified sixty-five overfished species in its latest report 
to Congress.4 The status of an additional 589 species is unknown.5 
While NMFS reports the number of healthy fish species has in­
creased in recent years, such gains have come at tremendous cost 
to local fishing communities faced with fishery closings and other 
stringent conservation measures. Nearly three decades of federal 
regulation have failed to provide for the sustainable utilization of 
America's marine resources. 
There is a need to rethink the near-exclusive reliance upon 
government management to protect marine resources. Efforts to 
design fishery management regimes that allow for substantial har­
vests while conserving fish populations have largely failed. Even 
where the necessary management measures can be identified, po­
litical influence impedes their adoption and effective implementa­
tion. Well-intentioned fishery regulation has failed to conserve 
fish stocks. Fortunately, there are alternatives to consider. 
There is substantial, yet inadequately explored, potential for 
private ordering and other nongovernmental solutions to environ­
mental problems. Order can emerge from the spontaneous interac­
tion of community members or common resource users. Such 
private ordering can produce, and has produced, resource manage­
ment regimes that could supplement, and in some cases, replace 
existing regulatory institutions for fishery management. Yet ob­
stacles must be overcome to realize the full potential of such man­
agement alternatives. It is well-known that coordination and free­
rider problems can frustrate the development of nongovernmental 
institutions. Less well-explored is the possibility that existing le­
gal rules inhibit the emergence of community-based :rules and con­
servation regimes. In the fisheries context, one such obstacle is 
antitrust law, which acts to obstruct cooperative management ar­
rangements that, by reducing harvest levels, mimic the effects of 
f:,Y0RH LOI,IP,OIlG, THE SKEI-'TTrAL E NVlIlONMBNTAJ.lST .06-08 (2001) (acknowledging 
that numerous ocean fisheries a re overfiRhed and suffering declining yields, and 
that futu/'e increases in fish production will come from aquacuJtme and fish farm­
ing, rather thap ocean fisheries). 
4. NAT'L MAHINE FISl ILRIES S ' ·:l;V., 107TH CariG., TOWARD }{" :lJl · II .Dn-:c 
AwtEllIrA'S '!'clSTTI<:RlES: AN1\TAL RI':PUHT TO CONGHI':SS ON TIll': 0TATl 'S OF U.s. FISH· 
EIVES-200l J1-12 tbl. 1 (2002), auailable at htLp://www,pmfs.noaa.gov/sfaJreports. 
hL-nl. 
5. {d. 
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cartels . Understanding how antitrust law and other legal 
frameworks can facilitate or frustrate private ordering is necessary 
to unleash the potential of nongovernmental institutions. 
Part II of this Article surveys the challenges of marine conser­
vation, the failures of existing regulatory regimes, and the poten­
tial for property rights in marine resources. Part III discusses the 
nature of private ordering, providing examples that arise from the 
fisheries context. Part IV discusses how legal rules can inhibit pri­
vate ordering. That section focuses in particular on how antitrust 
law has impeded cooperative fishery management. Part V then ex­
plores possibilities for overcoming antitrust obstacles to private or­
dering. This Article concludes with some broader thoughts about 
the implications of this research for resource conservation. 
II. THE CHALLENGE OF MARINE CONSERVATION 
It is a commonplace to observe that for natural resources - as 
for other types of wealth - "everybody's property is nobody's 
property. " 6 
Conservation of marine fisheries presents the archetypal 
"commons" problem, most famously detailed by ewlogist Garrett 
Hardin in The Tragedy of the Commons.7 Hardin described the 
fate of a common pasture, unowned and available to all. 8 In such a 
situation, it is in each herder's self-interest to maximize his use of 
the commons at the expense of the community at large. Each 
herder captures all of the benefit from adding one more animal to 
his herd. The costs of overgrazing the pasture, however, are dis­
tributed amongst every pasture user. When all the herders re­
6. Anthony Scott, The Fishery: The Objectives of Sole Ownership, 63 J. POL. 
ECON. 116, 116 (1955). Aristotle made the same point far earlier. See ARISTOTLE, 
POLITICS §1261.b32 (T.A. Sinclair trans., Trevor J . Saunders ed., Penguin Books 
1981) ("[TJhe greater the number of owners, the less the respect for common 
property."). 
7. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). While 
Hardin is most commonly associated with this analysis, the commons problems in 
the context of the fishery was described several years earlier in H. Scott Gordon, 
The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. 
ECON. 124 (1954). See also Scott, supra note 6. 
8. Hardin, supra note 7. It is important to note that Hardin's argument ap­
plies to open-access commons. Historically, common pastures were rarely open­
access, and were typically protected by common property rules, customary norms, 
or other restraints on consumption. See infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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spond to the incentives created by the open-access nature of the 
commons, the pasture is overgrazed. "Each man is locked into a 
system that compels him to increase his herd without limit - in a 
world that is limited."9 The pursuit of self-interest in an open-ac­
cess commons results in a tragedy; "[f]reedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all."lo 
This analysis applies well to most marine fisheries.H So long 
as there is open-access to the fishery, each fisher has an incentive 
to catch as much as possible, even beyond the point of sus­
tainability. These incentives are strong in the fishery context as 
the marginal cost of increased fishing effort for an active fisher is 
often quite small compared to the potential economic reward. 
Fishers do not benefit from self-restraint because none has any as­
surance that other participants in the fishery will follow suit. 
A. Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons 
The "tragedy of the commons" is not inevitable. If access to 
the common resource is controlled, and consumption restrained, 
the commons can be conserved. The initial choice of solutions to 
the commons problem, as described by Hardin, is between political 
controls and some form of private property. "The tragedy of the 
commons . . . is averted by private property, or something formally 
like it," Hardin explained, but where private property is lacking, 
the commons can only be saved by "mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon."12 In either case, "we seek the definite social ar­
rangements that will keep [the resource in question] from becom­
ing a commons."13 As Hardin presented the problem, conservation 
of the commons requires privatization or regulation. Whichever 
course is chosen, the aim is the same: control access and limit 
use.14 
9. Hardin, supra note 7, at 1244. 
10. ld. 
11. See Gordon, supra note 7, 

12, Hardin, supra note 7, at 1245, 1247. 

13. id. at 1247. 
14. See Randall Bess & Michael Harte, The Role of Property Rights in the De­
velopment of New Zealand's Seafood industry, 24 MARINE POL'y 331, 331 (2000) 
("The challenge for any fisheries policy and management system is to determine 
and enforce harvest levels that will sustain fish stocks and access rights to 
fisheries. ") , 
• 
• 
• 
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The creation of property rights is the most obvious means of 
preventing the tragedy of the commons. 15 As a general rule, where 
resources are owned, there is less concern about their overuse. 
Property owners have both the ability to protect the owned re­
source, and a substantial incentive to ensure that the value of their 
property - both to themselves and to others - is maintained. As 
Harold Demsetz explains, "[1]f a single person owns land, he will 
attempt to maximize its present value by taking into account alter­
native future time streams of benefits and costs and selecting that 
one which he believes will maximize the present value of his pri­
vately-owned land rights."16 Conversely, the lack of property 
rights provides substantial incentives against resource 
conservation. 17 
Not only do property rights provide incentives for better stew­
ardship, they also foster private ordering by reducing the costs of 
15. Gordon, supra note 7, at 134 ("Environmental conditions make necessary 
some vehicle which will prevent the resources of the community at large from be­
ing destroyed by excessive exploitation. Private or group land tenure accomplishes 
this end in an easily understandable fashion."). See generally David Schmidtz, The 
Institution of Property, in THE COMMON LAW AND THE ENVlRONMENT (Roger E . 
Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2000) (explaining "how property institutions 
convert negative-sum or zero-sum games into positive-sum games»). 
16. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
347, 355 (1967). "The development of private rights permits the owner to econo­
mize on the use of those resources from which he has the right to exclude others." 
Id. at 356. It is important to note that Demsetz's claim is not that every private 
landowner will act in this fashion, just that the incentives of ownership are such 
that the typical landowner will act in this fashion . As is true in all contexts, the 
behavior of specific individuals will vary, with some taking greater or lesser ac­
tions to maximize the present value of the property in question. Those property 
owners who do the best job of estimating likely future income streams are then 
rewarded in the marketplace with greater property values . See Robert J. Smith, 
Resolving the Tragedy uf the Commons by Creating Private Property Rights in 
Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 456 (1981) (''Wherever we have exclusive private owner­
ship, whether it is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit undertaking, 
there are incentives for the private owners to preserve the resource."). But see 
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Ail': Foul' Propositions About Property Rights and En­
vironmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 103, 117-25 (1999) (arguing 
there are many environmental problems for which property rights are not the 
"first-best" solution). 
17. Scott, supra note 6, at 116 ("No one will take the trouble to husband and 
maintain a resource unless he has a reasonable certainty of receiving some portion 
of the product of his management; that is, unless he has some property right in the 
yield."). Again, while it may be an overstatement to claim that "no one" will act in 
such a manner, this is clearly a case in which the exception proves the rule. 
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negotiating over remaining externalities.l8 Thus, it may not De 
necessary to establish property rights in all relevant resources to 
achieve a substantial amount of cost internalization. Conversely, 
the mere existence of externalities is often attributable to the ab­
sence of property rights and the consequent rights to contract. 19 
The creation of property rights is not always an option, how­
ever. Property rights can be difficult to define, monitor, and en­
force. 2o In some cases the costs of establishing property rights will 
be greater than the benefits.21 There may also be political, cul­
tural or social obstacles to their creation. In the context of fisher­
ies, individuated private property rights in fisheries are generally 
lacking because many species are mobile across vast expanses and 
access is difficult to monitor.22 These factors, among others, make 
it particularly costly to define and enforce property rights in the 
marine context.23 Property rights in fisheries have also been disfa­
vored in American law. 24 Various legal doctrines, including that of 
the public trust, hold that fisheries are held in trust by the govern­
18. See Schmidtz, supra note 15, at 120 (explaining how property rights re­
duce the transaction costs involved with internalizing externalities). 
19. Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure ofa Contract and the Theory ofa Non­
Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 51 (1970). 
20. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J .L. & ECON. 1, 15-16 
(1960). See generally Bruce Yandle & Andrew P . Morriss, The Technologies of 
Property Rights: Choice Among Alternative Solutions to Tragedies of the Commons, 
28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 139-41 (2001); Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill , The Evolu­
tion ofProperty Rights: A Study of the American West, 18 J .L. & ECON. 163, 165-67 
(1975). 
21. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, Privatizing the Commons: An Im ­
provement?, 50 S. ECON. J. 438, 438 (1985). 
22. See GARY LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 73-74 (19il9). 
23_ See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Contracting Problems and Ref<­
ulation: The Case of the Fishery, 21 AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1019 (1982) (noting how 
heterogeneity among fishers, including differences in productivity, can hamper 
support for property-based fishery management); Bonnie J. McCay, Social and 
Ecological Implications of ITQs: An Overview, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MCMT. 5 
(1995) (summarizing the various political concerns, such as "social equity, stew­
ardship, and what this means for public ownership," related to ITQs). See Barton 
H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 
30 ENVTL_ L. 241, 255-65 (2000), for other obstacles to the creation of property 
rights in fisheries. 
24. The United States Supreme Court has even gone so far as to state that "it 
is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish , birds or animals. Neither the States 
nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fi sherman or hunter, has 
title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful capture." 
Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265,284 (1977). 
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ment for the common use of all citizens25 For these reasons, most 
fishery conservation efforts of the past several decades have relied 
upon government regulation. 
It is now generally accepted that traditional regulatory ap­
proaches to fishery conservation have been a "spectacular fail­
ure."26 Regulatory controls have typically taken the form of limits 
on fishing seasons, boat size, fishing areas, equipment and the like. 
These measures are inefficient, in part, because they are all indi­
rect means of conserving fish stocks. However well-intentioned, 
such rules often lead to "absurd" results. 27 License controls and 
other entry restrict ions may limit the number of fishers, but they 
do not control the amount or intensity of fishing efforts .28 Man­
dates on the type of equipment that can be used, an effort to con­
trol total catch by mandating that fishers use less-efficient means 
of catching fish, encourage fishers to increase their investment in 
additional vessels or gear to compensate for the efficiency losses. 
Limits on the number of days fished encourage fishers to increase 
their effort on those days allowed. The results are rampant over­
capitalization in fisheries and a destructive "derby" system in 
which each fisher races to catch as much as he or she can before 
the season closes. Even in the regulated marine commons, "ruin is 
the destination toward which all men rush."29 
25. See, e.g., Douglas F. Britton, Comment, The Priuatization of the American 
Fishery: Limitations, Recognitions, and the Public Trust, 3 O CEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
217 (1997) . The state constitution of Alaska provides that "[wlherever occurring in 
the natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for their 
common use." ALASKA CONST. art . VIII, § 3. It is also worth noting that state regu· 
lations limiting fishery access in such a fashion so as to privilege state residents 
are suspect. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (discussing the theory of 
government ownership of fisheries); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876); 
Dobard v. State, 233 S.w.2d 440 (Tex. 1950); Dodgen v. Depuglio, 209 S.W.2d 588 
(Tex. 1948). 
26. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S. Fisher­
ies: Contracting for the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L Q. 813, 813 (1997). 
27. Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Fishing for Property Rights to Fish , 
in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 161, 162 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yan­
dle eds., 1993); see also MICHAEL DEALESSI, FISHING FOR SOLUTIONS 31-35 (1998) 
(summarizing the impacts of fishery regulation). 
28. See J ohnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1016; E .A. Keen, Common Prop ­
erty in Fisheries: Is Sole Ownership an Option?, 7 MARINE POL'y 197, 200 (1.983) 
(summarizing research documenting the failure of limited entry to reduce fishing 
effort). 
29. Hardin, supra note 7, at 1244. 
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In Alaska's halibut fishery, for example, as the government 
shortened the fishing season to prevent overfishing, fishers re­
sponded by purchasing larger, more powerful boats and accelerat­
ing their catch.30 Eventually, the halibut season was compressed 
from several months to only a few days.31 Fishery regulations pro­
duced overcapitalization while reducing the value of the fish 
caught. The resulting "race to fish" also increased the occupational 
hazards faced by halibut fishers. 32 Regrettably, this pattern has 
been repeated in many fisheries . Even where regulators set a total 
allowable catch (TAC) for the fishery, overcapitalization and the 
"race to fish" ensue. As James Wilen notes, "without a property 
rights system attached to the resource itself, the open access incen­
tives still operate."33 
There are numerous reasons for the failure of traditional regu­
latory controls. For starters, centralized governmental authorities 
face many obstacles in seeking to provide optimal levels of environ­
mental protection.34 Perhaps the greatest deficiency facing cen-­
t ralized regulatory authorities is the difficulty in centralizing 
sufficient knowledge to allocate resources in an efficient manner. 
As Nobel Prize-winning economist F.A. Hayek explained, "[Tlhe 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never 
exist s in concentrated or integrated form , but solely as the dis­
persed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge 
which all the separate individuals possess."35 In other words , ef­
30. Donald R. Leal, Fueling the Race to the Fish , in GOVERNMENTVERSUS ENVI­
RONMENT 48 (Donald R. Lea l ed. , 2002). 
31. [d. 
32. [d. 
33. J ames E . Wilen , Property Rights and the Texture of Rents in Fisheries 54 
(J an . 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (prepared for PERC's 
Thirteenth Political Economy Forum "Evolving Proper ty Rights in Marine Fisher­
ies" at Big Sky, Montana). 
34. Steven F . Edwards, Ownership of Renewable Ocean Resources, 9 MARIN I': 
RESOURCE ECON. 253, 257 (1994) (" [Glovernment f.:tilure ar ises because it is diffi­
cult to define or quantify a commodity, demand is not known, a lack of competition 
inhibits accountability and innovation, or government stakeholders are able to 
gain pecuniary and non-pecuniary sources of income.") (citing C. WOLF, JR., MAR­
KETS OR GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (MIT Press 
1988)). 
35. F.A. Hayek , The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 519 
(945); see also F .A. Hayek, The New Confusion About Planning, in NEW STUDlI:o:S 
IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 232, 236 (1978) 
("The chief reason why we cannot hope by central direction to achieve anything 
like the efficiency in the use of resources which the market makes possible is that 
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fective fishery management depends upon all manner of local and 
technical knowledge beyond the reach of any centralized manage­
ment agency.:i6 As a result of this "knowledge problem," well-in­
tentioned fishery management schemes have failed time and 
again. "The technological resourcefulness of fishermen has histori­
cally made a mockery of the most stringent and carefully crafted 
command and control regulations aimed at reducing fishing effort," 
note Shi-Ling Hsu and James Wilen. 37 Even expert regulators fail 
to anticipate the unintended consequences and feedbacks their 
regulations can induce. 
Politics also hampers the ability of regulators to safeguard 
fishery resources.:18 Fishery management councils are often sub­
ject to political pressure to increase the total allowable catch in a 
given season. Where scientific assessments of sustainable catch 
levels are uncertain, as is typically the case, there is substantial 
pressure to adopt less conservative assessments. 39 Without cer­
tain property rights in future catches, fishing interests have no in­
centive to endorse precautionary catch levels. This pressure can 
cause a "ratchet effect" that pushes fishing levels above sustaina­
ble levels.40 The problems of poor regulatory management have 
the economic order of any large society rests on a utilization of the knowledge of 
particular circumstances widely dispersed among thousands or millions of individ­
uals."); HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) ("Federal regulators never have been and never 
will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information neces­
sary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the technical requirements 
of particular locations and pollution sources."). For a longer discussion of the 
"knowledge problem" in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Let 50 Flow­
ers Bloom: Transforming the States into Laboratories of Environmental Policy , 31 
ENVTL. 1. REP. 11284, 11286 (2001), 
36. Ralph Townsend, Fisheries Self-Governance: Corporate or Cooperative 
Structures?, 19 M AH IN!!: P0L'y 39, 39 (1995) ("Local communities have extensive 
information about the resource and about the industry and its technology that is 
very useful in designing effective rules."). 
37. Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 
Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY 1.Q. 799, 806-07 (1997). 
38. See Leal, supra note 30, at 43 . 
39. AA Rosenberg et al., Achieving Sustainable Use ofRenewable Resources, 
262 SrI. 828, 829 (1993); see also Thompson, supra note 23, at 258-59. 
40. Botsford et aI., supra note 2, at 512; Donald Ludwig et aI., Uncertainty, 
Resource Exploitation, and Conservation: Lessons from History, 260 SCI. 17, 17 
(1993); Rosenberg et aI., supra note 39, at 828-29. 
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been combined by other government policies, such as subsidies, 
which further encourage overcapitalization and overfishing.41 
B. Property R ights Revisited 
The failure oftraditional regulations, and the recent success of 
alternative management strategies, has renewed interest in the 
potential use of property rights for marine conservation. As al­
ready noted, there is a substantial body of academic research de­
tailing why property rights regimes should improve the efficacy 
and efficiency of resource management.42 This work is not merely 
theoretical, however. There is a growing body of research docu­
menting how various sorts of property institutions, particularly va­
rious common property regimes or de facto property rights regimes 
grounded in custom or contract, have evolved in various societies 
to address potential common pool resource concerns.43 
Comparative analyses of private and political resource man­
agement are instructive.44 Oyster beds in Maryland are managed 
by the state.45 In neighboring Virginia, the beds are leased to pri­
vate part ies,46 while in Washington, oyster beds are privately 
owned in fee simple.47 As the theoretical literature would predict , 
privately managed oyster beds are healthier and more productive 
than those under state protection.48 Comparisons between pri­
41. See Leal , supra note 30, at 49-54. 
42 . See supra notes 10-17. 
43 . See, e.g., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE: INFORMAL 
SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS PROBLEM (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T. Simmons 
eds. , 1993) [hereinafter INFORMAL SOLUTIONS]; ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE 
COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
44. Comparative institutional an a lysis avoids the "nirvana" problem in which 
an obviously imperfect institutional arrangement is compared with a hypothesized 
ideal norm. As Harold Demsetz expla ins, this approach attempts "to assess which 
alternative real institutional arrangement seems best able to cope with the eco­
nomic problem." Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 
12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1969) (emphasis added). 
45. See Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P . Donnelly, Prices and Property 
Rights in the Fisheries, 42 S. ECON. J . 253, 260 (1979). 
46. See id. 
47. Michael DeAlessi, Fishing fo r Solutions: The S tate of the World's Fisheries, 
in EARTH REPORT 2000 94-95 (Ronald Bailey ed., 2000) . 
48. Id.; see also Richard J. Agnello & Lawrence P . Donn elly, Property Rights 
and Efficiency in the Oyster Industry, 18 J.L. & ECON. 521 (1975) (comparing the 
productivity of Maryland and Virginia oyster fisheries). 
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vately leased and publicly managed oyster beds in Louisiana and 
Mississippi, respectively, yield similar result s .49 
The effect of private ownership can also be seen in the explo­
sion in aquaculture production, which more than tripled between 
1985 and 1995.50 Aquaculture now accounts for approximately 
one-quarter of global fish harvests , and one-third of fish harvested 
for human consumption. 51 The explosion of aquaculture is rele­
vant to the discussion of property rights in marine resources be­
cause the fundamental difference between aquaculture and 
traditional ocean fisheries is the "degree of control" which, "at its 
core, is largely defined by the strength of property rights ."52 
Aquaculture operations are privately owned in their ent irety. As a 
result, producers need not worry about the tragedy of the commons 
and, therefore, have the incentive "to tinker, to experiment, and to 
innovate" in order to increase the productivity of their facilities. 53 
Aquaculture production is not without problems,54 but the explo­
sion in aquaculture production, when contr asted to the depletion of 
marine fisheries, illustrates the importance of property rights in 
conserving resources. 
The interest in property rights is also buoyed by the practical 
experience in several countries with property-based management 
systems, such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Under an 
ITQ system, the government sets the total allowable catch for a 
given season, and then allocates shares of the catch - quota - to 
individuals, boats, or firms as a form of transferable right. ITQ 
programs have been implemented in several countries with sub­
stantial success at increasing fishing efficiency, reducing overcapi­
t alization, and lessening the ecological impact of fishing 
operations. 55 Particularly significant , ITQs have encouraged fish­
ers to exercise greater stewardship. "It's the first group of fishers 
49. Agnello & Donnelly, supra n ote 45. 
50. DeAlessi, supra note 47, a t 109. 
51. J ames L. Anderson , Aquaculture and the Future: Why Fisheries Econo­
mists S hould Care, 17 MARINE RESOUHCE ECON. 133, 134 (2002) . 
52. [d . Of course, increased aquaculture production can contribut e to oLher 
environmental concerns. See DEALESSI, supra note 27, a t 54-55. 
53. DEALEsSI, supra note 27, at 54. 
54. See id. a t 54-57. 
55. See, e.g ., lIANNE H. GISSUHAHSON, OVEHFISHINC: THE IcELANDIC SOLUTION 
(In st. of Econ . Affairs ed. , 2000); R. Quentin Grafton et a I. , Private Property and 
Economic Efficiency: A Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. &, ECON. 679 
(2000); Robert Repetto, The A tlantic Sea Scallop Fishery in the US. and Canada: 
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I've ever encountered who turned down the chance to take more 
fish," noted Philip Major of New Zealand's Ministry of Agriculture 
after the implementation of ITQs.56 There have also been private 
initiatives to allocate annual harvests among firms in catch-lim­
ited fisheries so as to create quasi-property rights and capture the 
economic and ecological benefits that result. As discussed below, 
such cooperatives may develop where government resource manag­
ers have failed to implement ITQs or other property-based man­
agement regimes.57 
Property rights in natural resources do not require a sole pro­
prietor of the resource. Ownership, even "sole-ownership," can 
take many forms, including a cooperative, corporation, family 01' 
community organization.58 What is most important is that the 
property be allocated on a "scale" sufficient to eliminate - or at 
least mitigate - a commons problem. Whether the owner of a given 
resource is an individual, a corporation, or a community, the secur­
ity of the property right enables the owner to plan the present and 
future use of the resource so as to maximize the resource's present 
value, which includes the discounted value of future harvests.59 
There are numerous examples of local, community-based fish­
ery management regimes that could be characterized as "common 
property" regimes.60 Such regimes "are a way of privatizing the 
rights to something without dividing it into pieces."61 Typically, 
such regimes "have evolved in places where the demand on a re­
source is too great to tolerate open access, so property rights in 
resources have to be created, but some other factor makes it impos­
sible or undesirable to parcel the resource itself."62 The rules gov­
erning the use of the fishery are somewhat informal, often arising 
A Natural Experiment in Fisheries Management Regimes, YALE SCH. FORESTRY & 
ENVTL. STUD. (2001). 
56. DeAlessi, supra note 47 , at 99 (quoting Philip Major of New Zealand's 
Ministry of Agriculture after the implementation of ITQs). 
57. S ee infra notes 148-64 and accompanying text. 
58. See Scott, supra note 6, at 116. 
59. See id. at 122. 
60. See, e.g., Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Fisheries: Avoiding the 'Tragedy 
of the Commons' 2 (Jane S. Shaw ed., PERC Pol'y Series, Issue No. PS-7, 1996); 
OSTROM, supra note 43. 
61. Margaret McKean & Elinor Ostrom, Common Property Regimes in the 
Forest: Just a Relic from the Past?, 46 UNASYLVA 3, 6 (1995) (noting that "common 
property is shared private property."). 
62. [d. 
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out of local custom or community practice. The management ~'e­
gimes typically evolved over time to increase the returns to the 
users of the resource. H. Scott Gordon observed that in most 
"primitive" societies, property rights of one form or another in re­
newable resources were common and served to ensure "orderly ex­
ploitation and conservation of the resource."63 There have been 
efforts to adopt formal collective rules to limit catches and conserve 
the underlying resourt::e, though such efforts have been challenged 
in court.64 
As noted earlier, the mobility of many fish populations can 
make property rights in fish populations costly to define and en­
force . These costs are, in part, a function of existing tecrinology.65 
Over time, human ability to define and mark territories or monitor 
given populations of a species improves, facilitating the application 
of property-based institutions. During the initial settlement of the 
American West, it was difficult to define and enforce property 
rights due to the vast expanses and relative lack of fencing materi­
als. As populations increased, and the ability to assert control over 
water, grazing lands, and cattle herds became more important, the 
demand for technologies to define and enforce property rights in­
creased. These pressures spurred the development of barbed wire 
and complex branding systems.66 In much the same way, such 
branding and fencing technologies are beginning to emerge in the 
marine context, and may facilitate the further expansion of prop­
erty rights in fisheries.67 Such innovations range from fish scale 
analysis, which approximates branding or fingerprinting and catch 
sampling technologies, to remote tracking of fishing vessels using 
satellites and autonomous underw9.ter vehicles (e .g. "robo-tuna").68 
The application of property rights to marine conservation does 
not only face economic and technical hurdles. The adoption of enl 
63. Gordon, supra note 7, at 134. 
64. See infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text. 
65. Yandle & Morriss, supra note 20. 
66. Anderson & Hill, supra note 20, at 165-67. 
67. See Daniel Huppert & Gunnar Knapp, Technology and Property Rights in 
Fisheries Management, in THE TECHNOLOGY OF PI' )PERTY RIGHTS 79-99 (Terry L. 
Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds., 2002); DEALESSI, supra note 27, at 48-53. 
68. See DEALESSI, supra note 27 , at 49-52; Huppert & Knapp, supra note 67, 
at 88-94; see also Gregory B . Chris tainsen & Brian C. Gothberg, The Potential of 
High Technology for Establishing Tradable Rights to Whales, in THE TECHNOLOGY 
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 101-21 (2001). 
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modest property-based systems is politically controversial.69 ITQs 
can improve efficiency and facilitate conservation, but they may 
also lead to the redistribution of wealth or displacement of tradi­
tional fishing communities.70 Although ITQ systems have been 
implemented in a few U.S. fisheries,71 Congress enacted a morato­
rium on the adoption ofITQs in additional fisheries in 1996.72 The 
moratorium is due to expire, yet Congress is expected to impose 
new requirements on the adoption and operation offuture ITQ sys­
tems in U.S. waters.73 Thus, while it is generally accepted that a 
move toward greater property rights in marine resources would be 
beneficial , such a move faces substantial obstacles. 
III. PRIVATE ORDERING 
Order emerges perfectly from chaos not because of the way peo­
ple are bossed about, but because of the way individuals react 
rationally to incentives. 74 
Property r ights are often created by government action. Stat­
utes or regulations may recognize or create rights in a previously 
unowned resource, such as radio spectrum,75 or expand the num­
ber of sticks in the bundle of rights associated with a particular 
resource. Examples of the latter would include the recognition of 
conservation easements in land76 or instream flow rights to water 
69. See Scott C. Matulich et al. , Fishery Cooperatives as an Alternative to 
ITQs: Implications o{ the Amel'lcan Fisheries Act, 16 MARlNE RESOURCE ECON. 1, 1 
(2001) (noting the continuing resis tance to property r ights approaches to fishery 
conservation). 
70. See McCay, .~ upra Dote 23, at 5 (summarizing the benefits of and potential 
concerns with ITQs). 
71. Id. 
72. Susta inable Fisheries Act § 108, 16 U .S .C. § 185.3 (1996) (es t ablishing a 
moratorium on new fishery management plans from J anuary 4, 1995 until October 
1, 2002). 
73. See, e.g., More Time {or IFQs, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 2002, a t A8. 
74. MA'n RlDLEY, Ti-m ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND TI-m EVOLlJ­
TION OF COOPERATION 238 (1996). 
75. See, e.g. , Thomas W. H azlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spec­
trum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529 
(1988). 
76. See generally GERALD KORNGOLD, P RIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: 
EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES (1990). It should be 
noted that conservation easements are not without their problems. See, e.g., Julia 
D . Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 739 (2002). 
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in the western United States .77 In each case, the resource in ques­
t ion - land, water - could be owned, but legislative action ex­
panded the rights associated with the resource. In other cases, 
government entities may simply recognize rights that are observed 
and accepted within a local community. 
Yet government is not the sole source of order and de facto 
property rights may emerge absent government action.78 Harold 
Demsetz hypothesized that property rights emerge when the bene­
fits of property arrangements exceed the costs of defining and en­
forcing such rights. In his words, "property rights develop to 
internalize externalities when the gains of internalization become 
larger than the cost of internalization."79 The relative costs and 
benefits of property rights are a function ofmany variables, includ­
ing existing property rights, economic values, technology, cultural 
norms and relative homogeneity, and changing environmental con­
dit ions, among other factors.8o The absence of property rights in 
complementary resources can increase the costs of enforcing any 
arrangements designed to limit the access to a common resource as 
welI.Bl 
There is a rich history of property and quasi-property arrange­
ments developing organically (spontaneously) outside of the state's 
formal apparatus, though such developments are often later recog­
nized and sanctioned by the state.82 This history supports the 
claim that "informal social networks are capable of creating rules 
that establish property rights."83 Robert Ellickson's hypothesis is 
that "members of a close-knit group develop and maintain norms 
whose content serve to maximize the aggregate welfare that mem­
77. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PR[M[NG THE 
INV fSfBLE PUMP 111-32 (1997). 
78 . See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGH­
BORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
79. Demsetz, supra note 16, at 350. 
80. See id. 
81. Cheung, supra note 19, at 52. 
82. See, e.g. , INFORMAl. SOLUT[ONS, supra note 43; Elinor Ostrom, Reformu­
lating the Commons, in PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 17-20 (Joanna Burger et al. eds. , 2001) and the 
sources cited therein. A similar phenomenon has been documented in the area of 
intellectual property. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intel­
lectual Property Rights and Collectiue Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 
(1996). 
83. ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 203. 
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bers obtain in their workaday affairs with one another."84 The 
"close-knit" nature of the group can arise from cultural homogene­
ity, such as that which one may find in an isolated community, or 
from close contact over time due to shared experiences or occupa­
tions.85 These norms, which constrain behavior much as formal 
legal rules, limit behavior within the group for mutual advantage. 
Such norms are the means through which many earlier societies 
avoided the "tragedy of the commons" in common pastures and the 
like.86 They also can help to define or reinforce the group's cohe­
sion.87 These understandings can be formalized, as when courts 
recognize the longstanding traditions about who owns which 
whale,88 but can also remain unsanctioned. 
A noteworthy example of long-lasting, informal property 
rights in action are the "harbor gangs" of Maine's lobster fisher­
ies.89 Only gang members are allowed to harvest lobsters in desig­
nated areas.90 There is no formal legal prohibition on outsiders 
fishing in gang territories, but the boundaries are defended 
through self-help.91 The regime exists "only because ofthe benign 
neglect of the state."92 If warnings to observe traditional territo­
84. [d. at 167. Wealth-maximizing norms are those norms that "minimize the 
members' objective sum of (1) transaction costs and (2) deadweight losses arising 
from failures to exploit potential gains from trade." [d. at 184. 
85 . See Terry L. Anderson & Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the 
Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-Down, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 73, 79 
(1999). The potential for norms that facilitate cooperation may be due as much, if 
not more, to repeated interactions than cultural homogeneity. Jonathan Macey 
suggests that it is "repeated interactions, not the closely knit nature of the groups, 
that leads to cooperation ." Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and 
the Production of Legitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 
1123, 1131 (1997). 
86. See, e.g., Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL. 
ETHICS 49 (1985); OSTROM, supra note 43. 
87. ELLlCKSON, supra note 78, at 234-35 ("Constitutive norms can enhance 
group solidarity by structuring dealings in a way that requires members continu­
ally to reaffirm their ongoing trust."). 
88. See, e.g., Swift v. Gifford, 23 F. Cas. 558 (D. Mass. 1872) (No. 13,696). 
89. See generally James J. Acheson, Capturing the Commons: Legal and Ille­
gal Strategies, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CUSTOMS AND CULTURE: INFORMAL 
SOLUTIONS TO THE COMMONS PROBLEM 69-83 (Terry L. Anderson & Randy T. Sim­
mons eds. , 1992) (hereinafter Acheson, Capturing the Commons] . See also JAMES 
J . ACHESON, THE LOBSTER GANGS OF MAINE (1988) [hereinafter ACHESON, LOBSTER 
GANGS]. 
90. ACHESON, LOBSTER GANGS, supra note 89, at 48. 
91. See id. at 49. 
92. Acheson, Capturing the Commons, supra note 89, at 80. 
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ries are not heeded, gang members will cut the buoy lines on the 
lobster traps of the offending fisher. 93 H. Scott Gordon notes that 
the harbor gangs effectively create "local monopol[ies]" that limit 
entry and consumption.94 Where such measures are successfully 
enforced, they reduce overcapitalization and increase incomes in 
what would otherwise be open-access fisheries.95 Political develop­
ments have weakened some of the territorial claims, but where the 
informal territories are enforced, lobster catch productivity is 
higher and fishing pressure is reduced.96 
Ellickson's research on property norms in the whaling indus­
try during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries further sup­
ports the hypothesis that people in close-knit groups will tend to 
develop norms to govern workaday situations common to the 
group.97 Specifically, whaling communities developed substantive 
norms governing the right to capture and recover whale car­
casses.98 Each rule encouraged whaling by rewarding the ship 
that first harpooned the whale, while also allowing for others to 
harvest seemingly abandoned whales that had been killed or 
wounded by another ship.99 Which rule a given fishery adopted 
was dependent upon the type of whale most commonly hunted 
there. A norm that a ship owned a whale, dead or alive, so long as 
the whale was fastened by a line or otherwise secured to the ship, 
made sense for slow and "mild" tempered whales, such as right 
whales. loo A different norm was required "in fisheries where the 
more vigorous sperm whales predominated."lol The history of the 
whaling industry demonstrates that "informal social networks are 
capable of creating rules that establish property rights."102 Also 
notable in this case is that whalers appear to have adopted as 
norms the particular set of rules that maximized social welfare 
given the particular circumstances of each fishery.lo3 
93. Id. at 74. 
94. Gordon, supra note 7, at 134. 
95. See id. 
96. Acheson, Capturing the Commons, supra note 89, at 74. 
97. Robert C. Ellickson, A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence 
from the Whaling Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 84 (1989). 
98. Id. at 88. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. at 89. 
101. Id. at 90. 
102. Id. at 94. 
103. Id. at 87-88. 
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Whaling norms did not just "mimic" law; in effect "they cre­
ated law."104 Whalers t reated the norms as binding, and generally 
105agreed upon which norm was applicable in which circumstance.
Where conflicts arose, it tended to be because there was a factual 
dispute about whether a given ship or salvager had satisfied the 
requirements of the governing norm. Ellickson reports that courts 
routinely applied the governing norm to whaling disputes, rather 
than applying law from an external source. lOG 
One benefit of private ordering is the tendency to reduce the 
costs of rule creation. Rules that evolve from local cultural norms 
may require less effort to enforce than externally imposed rules. 107 
When rights are established by those within the community 
("residual claimants"), there is greater incentive to minimize the 
costs of rights creation and enforcement.108 This is due in part to 
the fact that the community in question will bear the costs of r ights 
definition and enforcement, and reap the benefits of the economic 
surplus generated by right creation. On the American Western 
Frontier, for example, residual claimant organizations, such as cat­
tlemen's associations and mining camps, created more efficient 
property rules than did legislative measures such as the Home­
stead Act. 109 Also, nongovernmental responses to changing eco­
nomic conditions are often more rapid than governmental 
responses.110 In sum, it is reasonable to conclude that, where it 
may operate, "private ordering generates substantive legal princi­
ples that are superior to those that the state produces."1l1 
A weakness of such informal systems is that they have diffi­
culty with outsiders . Informal systems work only sc long as all 
those participating understand the common rules, or if the infor­
mal entity has a means of excluding outsiders or enforcing rules. 
On the Western Range, for example, cattlemen established cus­
tomary range rights, enforced by line camps and cattlemen's as­
104. Id. at 85. 
105. Id. at 88. 
106. See id. at n.5 and the cases cited therein . 
107. Townsend, supra note 36, at 40. 
108. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 20, a t 443. This a lso may be an argument 
in favor of "corporate" ra ther than "cooperative" governance structures to manage 
common pool resources. Townsend, supra note 36, at 40-43. 
109. See Anderson & Hill, supra note 20, at 443-48. 

1l0. Cheung, supra note 19, at 68. 

llI. Macey, supra note 85, at 1140. 
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sociations. Jl2 Newcomers were excluded from the range by 
excluding them from participation in the annual cattle roundups 
that were necessary to run cattle on the range.113 This system be­
gan to break down when sheepherders entered the Western Range. 
Sheepherders had no need to participate in the annual roundups, 
so it was difficult to exclude them from the range and maintain the 
customary range right system.114 
With growth in size and heterogeneity, private ordering gener­
ally needs to become more formal if it is to survive. Custom and 
practice will either become recognized by the formal legal system ­
e.g., common law court decisions recognizing the customary rules­
or the understanding will become formalized through legislation or 
written contracts. Collective institutions, such as neighborhood 
associations, resource user cooperatives, and the like, can be cre­
ated with formal responsibilities. In such cases, contracting re­
places customary dealing. This can create new problems, however, 
as the costs of contracting can be greater than the costs of reaching 
a shared understanding in a small homogenous community. None­
theless, the operational principle is the same, and contracting will 
occur where the benefits to be gained are greater than the transac­
tion costs involved.lI5 
The private creation of rights and obligations through contract 
can be particularly valuable - and costly. On the one hand, con­
tracts embody the contracting parties' subjective valuations of po­
tential outcomes. Thus, contracts are far superior to government 
regulations and other third-party controls at reducing dead-weight 
losses.l 16 At the same time, the transaction costs involved in con­
tracting and enforcing contractual agreements can be particularly 
high.117 Norms that arise from cultural homogeneity or common 
understandings can reduce such costs, but such norms do not al­
ways exist. In the fishery context, such contract-facilitating norms 
are more likely in those industries, areas, and communities in 
which the participants have an extended course of dealing. It is 
112. S ee, e.g., Anderson & Grewell, supra note 85, at 80-82. 
11:l. Id. at 81. 
114. [d. at. 82. 
115. Additionally, "there is no reason why unrelated entities cannot simply de­
cide to become closely knit when it is in their interest." Macey, supra note 85, at 
1131. 
116. ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 246. 
117. Id. 
28 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:9 
also worth noting that the dividing line between contract and "cus­
tom" is often illusory. As Steven Cheung notes, "[S]ome asserted 
'customs' are, in fact, market practices in which the contractual 
terms are not obvious."118 They are contracts nonetheless. 
IV. OBSTACLES TO PRIVATE ORDERING 
The process of private ordering is not wholly independent of 
positive law. Existing legal rules and institutions affect the viabil­
ity of such arrangements and the trajectory of their development. 
Native Americans had well-established property rights to fishing 
sites along the Columbia River prior to the arrival of European set­
tlers. Later, these rights were effectively destroyed by the State of 
Washington, which imposed its own rules governing local fisher­
ies. 119 Legal traditions can also facilitate, or inhibit, reforms that 
would facilitate private ordering. 
As discussed above, private ordering occurs when the benefits 
gained from such arrangements exceed the related transaction 
costS.120 Legal institutions have a tremendous impact on such 
costs. The recognition, valuation, and enforcement of private prop­
erty rights, for example, can facilitate private ordering by clarify­
ing the legal entitlements of those engaged in negotiations, 
contracts, or other interactions. The lack of property rights mud­
dies the water, obscuring the nature and extent of the relevant le­
gal entitlements, thereby increasing the transaction costs. At the 
extreme, "the prohibition of voluntary negotiations makes the cost 
of transacting infinite."121 
Of particular interest for this paper is the effect that antitrust 
law has on the potential for private ordering in marine fisheries. 122 
118. Cheung, supra note 19, at 57 n.16. 
119. See Robert Higgs, Legally Induced Technical Regress in the Washington 
Salmon Fishery, 7 RES. ECON. HIST. 55, 55-56 (1982). 
120. See supra notes 78-81. 
121. Demsetz, supra note 16, at 348. Demsetz's claim here is obviously an ex­
aggeration - illegal negotiations and contracts are quite common - but the point is 
quite valid . Indeed, it is common knowledge that legal prohibitions greatly in­
crease the transaction costs of negotiation, particularly for otherwise law-abiding 
citizens. 
122. The conflict between antitrust law and marine conservation is explored in 
further depth in Jonathan H. Adler, Antitrust Barriers to Cooperative Fishery 
Management, in EVOLVING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES (Donald Leal 
ed., forthcoming 2003) and Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation through Collusion 
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) . 
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Where the costs of transacting or coordinating are low in compari­
son to the potential gains from such organization, fishers will or­
ganize various collective institutions to enhance fisher income, 
manage fish harvests, and support conservation. Such organiza­
tions traditionally operate to regulate fishing activity and, in many 
cases, limit the entry of newcomers. Under existing antitrust law, 
however, such arrangements are often illegal as agreements "in re­
straint of trade."123 Even if antitrust law's prohibition does not 
make the cost of such arrangements "infinite," it does increase the 
relative costs of such institutions , undermining their viability. If 
the likelihood of private ordering is a function of the relative costs 
and benefits of such institutional development, a legal rule that 
significantly increases the costs of private ordering can effectively 
prohibit such developments. 
The conflict between conservation and antitrust law arises be­
cause what the former demands, the latter condemns. The aim of 
antitrust law is to protect consumers from anti-competitive con­
duct that reduces output and increases prices for consumers. Ar­
chetypal anti-competitive conduct is the creation of a "horizontal" 
agreement among competitors - a cartel - that seeks to raise prices 
for a good or service to super-competitive levels by reducing out­
put. Such arrangements are illegal under the Sherman Actl24 be­
cause such arrangements have the tendency to reduce consumer 
welfare. 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is 
a good example of the sort of horizontal cartel prohibited under 
U.S. law.125 OPEC members seek to increase the price of crude oil 
by collectively agreeing to reduce production to set levels. Ironi­
cally, were OPEC concerned about the conservation of its petro­
leum reserves, it might engage in the very same behavior - cutting 
oil production - which would have the same effect on consumers ­
increased prices. Users of a common pool resource who wish to 
123. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) . 
124. [d. §§ 1-7. 
125. OPEC has been described as "the greatest cartel of our time. " W. KIp VIS­
CUS I ET AL., ECONOMIGS OF RGGULATION AND ANTITRUST, 611-13 (2d ed. 1995). 
OPEC is also a good example of how cartel restrictions can be difficult to enforce 
absent a viable enforcement mechanism. The more successful the cartel is at rais­
ing prices , the greater the incentive each member has to cheat. See generally 1 
HANDBOOKOF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS 425-30 (Richard Schmalensee & Richard 
D . Willig eds ., 1989). 
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conserve that resource typically have little choice but to reduce 
their consumption. Such restraint may help conserve the resource, 
but it will also reduce consumer welfare insomuch as it leads to 
higher prices. Indeed, the most direct agreement to constrain con­
sumption of a common-pool resource to sustainable levels will con­
stitute a per se violation of antitrust law. As the Supreme Court 
explained in 1940, "a combination formed for the purpose and with 
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the 
price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is illegal per 
se. "126 As a result, if it is necessary to reduce the consumption of a 
natural resource, such as a marine fishery, only the government is 
permitted to adopt such conservation measures. The same mea­
sures adopted voluntarily by the users of the resource are against 
the law. 
The history of the Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Associ­
ation (GCSOA) provides a good example of the way antitrust law 
inhibits private ordering in marine fisheries. The GCSOA was cre­
ated in the 1930s to increase shrimpers' revenue by regulating 
shrimp harvests and controlling prices along the Mississippi Coast 
in the Gulf of Mexico. 12 7 The GCSOA negotiated exclusive con­
tracts with local packers.128 GCSOA members could only sell their 
catch to contracting packers, and the packers agreed to pay GC­
SOA members a minimum price.l29 GCSOA rules also served to 
exclude new entrants from the fishery.l3o 
The GCSOA was successfully prosecuted for an illegal price­
fixing arrangement under the Sherman Act. 131 To be sure, the 
umon did set prices with shrimp packers in an effort to increase its 
members' incomes, but not in the fashion ordinarily targeted by 
antitrust enforcement. The minimum prices served a conservation 
126. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U .S. HiO, ::'.23 (1939). Anti­
trus t doctrine has become a bit more nuanced since 1939, but the Socony-Vacuum 
case is still considered the "definitive statement" of the law regarding price-fixing. 
RICHARD A. POS N E R, ANTITRUST LAW 36-37 (2d ed. 2001). 
127. Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 100S. 

12S. See w. 

129. Gulf Coast Shrimpers & Oystermans Ass'n v. United Statc<i, 236 F .2d 65S, 
660 (5th Cir. 1956). It is worth noting that the GCSOA members did not merely 
agree to set prices amongst themselves. See Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 
100S. Contracts with the packers were necessary to ensure that union members 
complied with the union's rules . See id. 
130. See Gulf Coast Shrimpers, 236 F.2d at 661. 
131. [d. at 65S. 
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purpose. '::.'he prices were set based upon the size of the shrimp, 
measured in tails per pound.I32 The minimum price for small 
shrimp set by the GCSOA was generally set above the market 
price; the price for larger, more valuable shrimp, was not. I33 In 
this fashion, the price scheme discouraged the harvest of small, im­
mature shrimp early in the shrimping season because the proces­
sors would be reluctant to meet the required price. This ensured 
there would be larger and more valuable shrimp for harvest later 
in the season. Their efforts were successful, as Mississippi shrimp 
prices were generally higher than those in neighboring Louisiana, 
largely due to the greater proportion of larger shrimp in the har­
vestp 4 As Gary Libecap notes, this price scheme, combined with 
GCSOA's power to restrict entry (assert property rights) to the 
fishery, increased member incomes, even though they sold their 
I35shrimp to a national market.
The GCSOA experience shows that "private gTOUp regulations 
of fisheries could be an alternative to government regulation ifthat 
option were politically acceptable."136 Indeed, decades after the 
prosecution of the GCSOA for antitrust violations, Gulf states were 
enforcing shrimp harvest regulations on minimum shrimp size 
that had the same effect137 The government regulations, however, 
made no effort to limit entry to the fishery.l38 As a result, the Gulf 
shrimp fishery is overcapitalized. By the late 1980s, it was esti­
mated that the annual shrimp catch could be harvested with one­
third the number of boats. 139 
Gulf Coast Shrimpers &: Oystermans Ass'n v. United States 
was not an isolated case. In the 1930s and 1940s there were sev­
eral antitrust actions against fishers' unions throughout the coun· 
try. 140 Sometimes the cases were brought by government 
authorities. In others, private plaintiffs used the antitrust stat­
132. Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23 , at 1008. 
133. LIBI';CAP, supra note 22, at 88. 
134. [d. at 89; Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1010 n.21. 
135. LIBECAl', supra note 22, at 88. 
136. [d. at 90. 
137. Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1009·10. 
138. [d. at 1009-10. 
139. See Lea!, supra note 30, at 45·46. 
140. Se(', e.g., Local 36 of Int'l Fishermen & Allied Workers of Am. v. United 
State~, 177 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1949); Hawaiian Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. Int'! Long­
shoremen'::; & Warehousemen'::; Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1947); Columbia 
River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970 (D. Or. 1939). 
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utes to seek treble damages against the defendants. 141 In each 
case, the aspects and practices of the fishers' unions that provided 
potential conservation benefits were precisely what made them ob­
jectionable to antitrust enforcers. Patrick McHugh and the Atlan­
tic Fisherman's Union, for instance, were prosecuted because they 
"effectively limited the quantity and species of fish landed in New 
Bedford."142 Regardless of whether McHugh was a forward-look­
ing conservationist or a price-gouging rent-seeker, his union 
helped prevent overfishing. As the court explained, "[Hlad it not 
been for defendants' illegal restraints, a 'much greater' volume of 
scallops and other fish would have been brought into and sold in 
the port of New Bedford."14:3 
Another notable case involves the California sardine fishery. 
In 1940, Frank Manaka sued the Monterey Sardine Industries, 
Inc., a cooperative association of fishing boat owners, and the Del 
Mar Canning Co. for conspiring to set prices and restrict entry into 
the California sardine flshery.144 Under an agreement among the 
association, the cannery, and the local fishermen's union, the asso­
ciation set the price for which its members' fish were sold to the 
cannery.145 The assocIation served both pecuniary and conserva­
tion purposes. On the one hand, it restricted entry by non-local 
fishers and helped maintain high fish prices and member profits. 
On the other hand, it limited harvesting, thereby helping to con­
serve fish stocks.] 46 
As in the GCSOA case, the court found the association in viola­
tion of federal antitrust law. The district court held that: 
[Sluch an association as that of the boat owners is not freed 
from the restrictive provisions of the anti-trust act, because 
they profess in the interest of conservation of important food 
fish to regulate the price and the manner of taking such fish 
141. Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2000), any person who is 
injured by actions which are illegal under federal antitrust law may file suit in 
federal district court, id., and may seek recovery of "threefold the damages by him 
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." [d. § 15. 
142. McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252, 254 (1st Cir. 1956). 
143. [d. 
144. Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1941). 
145. [d . at 533. 
146. After Manaka waR prevented from selling fish in Monterey, the associa­
tion offered to let him come back to fish to replace a local boat which had been 
disabled. [d. This suggests that at least one purpose of the association was to 
maintain an upper limit on the harvest level. 
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"unauthorized by legislation and uncontrolled by proper 
authority."147 
In other words, the association's conduct was no less exclu­
sionary because it served, in part, to conserve fish stocks. An 
agreement among otherwise-competing users of a common pool re­
source to conserve the resource by restricting their aggregate out­
put is illegal. Monterey Sardine Industries was found guilty of 
conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, and 
Manaka was awarded triple damages under the Clayton Act. 148 
If anything, the ruling in Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus­
tries had worse effects on conservation than did the GCSOA case. 
In the 1930s, the California sardine fishery was at its peak, yield­
ing over 500,000 tons of fish per year. 149 By the early 1950s, the 
fishery was beginning to collapse; "the pressures on the fishery 
were too great, and by 1952 for all practical purposes, the commer­
cial sardine fishery was finished."l!iQ Perhaps the timing of the 
fishery's collapse is coincidental. 151 The collapse may have been 
inevitable so that sardine harvest levels would have depleted the 
fishery even if Monterey Sardine Industries' collusive arrangement 
had been permitted to survive. On the other hand, antitrust law 
may have destroyed a well-functioning cooperative institution that 
was capable of forestalling or mitigating the sardine fishery's 
collapse. 
The bulk of the reported antitrust prosecutions against fisher 
unions occurred during the 1940s and 1950s.152 Yet the reverbera­
tions of these cases are still felt in fisheries. "The mere threat of 
antitrust investigation adds another chilling breeze to the already 
147. Id. at 534 (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 
970, 975 (D. 01'. 1939)). 
148. Id. at 536; see 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000). 
149. LIBECAP, supra note 22, at 76. 
150. Id. at 77. 
151. For an historical account discussing other factors in the fishery's collapse , 
see ARTHUR F. McEvoy, THE FISHERMAN'S PROBLEM: ECOLOGY AND THE LAW IN THE 
CALIFORNIA FISHERIES, 1850-1980, at 153-55 (1986). 
152. Major cases included: Columbia River Packers Ass'n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 
520 (1942); McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252 (1st Cir. 1956); Local 36 ofInt'l 
Fishermen & Allied Workers ofAm. v. United States, 177 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1949); 
Manaka v. Monterey Sardine Indus., 41 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1941); Hawaiian 
Tuna Packers, Ltd. v. Int'l Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, 72 F. 
Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1941). Johnson & Libecap, supra note 23, at 1008 n.9. There 
are exceptions. See, e.g., United States v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Miss. 
1993). 
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challenging climate for forming community organizations to con­
serve natural resources."153 Subsequent efforts to create coopera­
tive ventures have been threatened with prosecutionJ54 This 
chilling effect is particularly powerful because the Clayton Act pro­
vides for treble damages in successful private antitrust enforce­
ment act ions.155 This creates a powerful incentive for fishers to 
stay well clear of those activities that could run afoul of antitrust 
156laws. Surveying self-governance arrangements in fisheries, 
Ralph Townsend encountered substantial reluctance by fishers in 
the United States and Canada to discuss such arrangements for 
fear of government regulation or prosecutionYi7 
In defense of antitrust enforcement, it is important to note 
that most of the collective fisher organizations prosecuted for anti­
trust violations were motivated by pecuniary interest. It appears 
that the union organizers were more concerned with increasing the 
incomes of their membership than in preserving our world's 
marine heritage. It is also the case that not all collective arrange­
ments designed to increase fish prices had conservation effects. In 
at least one case, the court in question found that demand was suf­
ficiently inelastic that the local union's efforts to drive up prices 
would not have reduced consumption. 15fl Nonetheless, in most 
cases it appears the collusive arrangements reduced harvest levels , 
thereby relieving, if not altogether eliminating, pressures on local 
fish populations, and that the unions were aware of the potential 
conservation benefits of their actions. There should be little doubt 
that some opportunities for conservation were lost due to the pros­
ecution of such arrangements. If nothing else, the collusion among 
fishers created collective entities with interest and ability in con­
153. Bruce Yandle, Antitrust and the Commons: Cooperation or Collusion?, 3 
THE INDEP. REV. 37, 50 (1998). 
154. See J ohnson & Libecap, supra note 23 , at 1007 n.8 (stating that the Fed­
eral Trade Commission warned that voluntary agreements to limit the number of 
boats in the fishery would violate the Sherman Act). 
155. 15 U.S.C . § 15(a) (2000). 
156. The modest exemption provided under the Fisherman's Collective Market­
ing Act is insufficient to mitigate this effect. See Joseph M. Sullivan, Harvesting 
Cooperatives and U.S. Antitrust Law Recent Developments and Implications 3-4, 
at http://oregonstate.eduideptJIIFET/2000/papers/sullivan.pdffJuly 11, 2000) (pre­
pared for "Microbehavior and Macroresults: ITFET 2000" at Oregon State Univer­
sity, July 11, 2000). 
157. Townsend, supra note 1, at 257. 
158. See Hawaiian Tuna Packers , Ltd v. Int'I Longshoremen's & Warehouse­
men's Union, 72 F. Supp. 562 (D. Haw. 1947). 
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serving the underlying resource that CQuld well have safeguarded 
the resource as conservation concerns became more acute.159 
V. OVERCOMING THE OBSTACLES 
The threats of wasted and destroyed fi sheries, extinguished 
species, and diminished water quality in rivers are real, but 
the possibilities that associated monopoly restrictions will im· 
pose significant costs on the economy are purely speculative 
and, if realized, are apt to be small and fleeting. 160 
The obstacles to private ordering in marine fisheries are not 
insurmountable. Even the restrictions Imposed by antitrust law 
can be mitigated, if not avoided altogether through informality. If 
arrangements are not formalized, they may not be subject to anti­
trust prosecution. Not all collective arrangements among fishers 
are formalized in contracts. Particularly in local, homogeneous 
communities, cooperation among otherwise-competing firms or in­
dividuals may be facilitated by customs and cultural norms. 161 As 
noted above, lobstermen in Maine have effectively divided local 
lobster fisheries into discrete territories and informally agreed to 
limit the lobster catch. 162 Harbor gangs enforce these boundaries 
among themselves and against outsiders. Were these agreements 
formalized, however, they would almost certainly be illegal. Infor·· 
mality may lessen the risk of antitrust prosecution, but it also can 
undermine the effectiveness of the collective arrangement. As a 
result, the property rights are less secure and depend upon the 
community's ability to maintain relative homogeneity and 
agreement. 
In recent years , modest fisher cooperatives have gained ac­
ceptance under antitrust law.l63 In some U.S. fisheries, resource 
users have found it possible to create cooperative entIties to assist 
with fishery management and allocate shares among fishers de­
spite the strictures of antitrust law. The cooperatives are created 
to rationalize the fishery management and address overcapitaliza­
159. See LIBECAP, supra note 22, a t 90 (noting that the "success" of the various 
unions "indicates that private group regulations of fisheries could be an alterna­
tive to government regulation if that option were politically acceptable"). 
160. Yandle, supra note 153, at 40. 
161. OSTROM, supra note 43. 
162. See supra notes 89-96. 
163. See generally Sullivan, supra note 156. 
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tion, waste, and inefficiency through the creation of de facto ITQ 
systems. Historically, such collective entities were considered 
"within the 'market allocation' class of per se violations that are 
illegal" under federal antitrust law.164 In fisheries where catch 
limits have already been imposed by regulatory authorities, how­
ever, the federal government has been more receptive to coopera­
tive arrangements, such as harvesting cooperatives, that allocate 
catch shares among licensed fishers. 
One example of such a cooperative is the Pacific Whiting Con­
servation Cooperative (PWCC). Prior tG creation of the PWCC, the 
U.S. Pacific Coast whiting fishery was subject to strict catch limits, 

fishing licenses were limited but transferable, and the total catch 

allowed was divided among several classes of fishing firms: on­

shore processing plants, "mothership" processors, and catcher/ 

processors. I65 Within each class the fishery adopted an "olympic" 

system, whereby any licensed fishing firm was entitled to catch as 

much of the harvest allocated to its class as it was able. In prac­

tice, this encouraged a race to fish, as each fishing firm sought to 

harvest as many fish as it could within a short period of time so as 

to capture the greatest share of the harvest allocated to its class. ) 

While the total catch limit helped conserve the fishery, the compet­

itive pressure of the "olympic" system fostered overcapitalization, 

inefficiency, and waste, including substantial by-catch - the inci­

dental catching of non-target fish species. The race to fish was so 

intense that under the existing rules, the pressure to catch fish 

quickly was so great that the entire quota would be harvested in 

just fourteen days.I66 

By 1996, there were only four catcher/processors left in the 
fishery.I67 These firms recognized that the allocation of property 
rights to portions of the catch - ITQs or some other share alloca­
tion - would yield substantial benefits. Specifically, the firms rec­
ognized they could cut costs and increase product recovery by as 
much as twenty-five percent by allocating quota shares, thereby 
164. Id. at 2. 
165. A "mothership" processor is a ship that has on-board processing capability 
but does not itself catch fish. A catcher/processor is a ship that catches and 
processes its own fish on-board. 
166. Bruce Ramsey, Companies Agree to End "Race for Fir:h," SJ·;ATTLE POST­
INTELLIGENCER, May 31, 1997, at B8. 
167. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 4. 
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eliminating the race to fish. 168 The formal creation of ITQs in the 
fishery was not an option, however, due to a Congressionally en­
acted ITQ moratoriumJ69 
To obtain the benefits of a property-based management sys­
tem, the catcher/processors created the PWCC.170 Because there 
were so few firms involved, each sharing a common interest, the 
coordination costs were low enough to reach a quick agreement on 
how to divide the catchJ71 They further agreed to make their allo­
cations transferable among each other.l72 The Antitrust Division 
of the Justice Department consented to the formation of the coop­
erative because the four firms agreed to continue processing, mar­
keting, and selling their products on a competitive basis, and 
because the agreement would not further reduce fishery output. 173 
Joel Klein, the then-acting Assistant Attorney General for Anti­
trust, observed that the harvest allocation was "unlikely to reduce 
output or increase price under any scenario."174 To the contrary, 
due to increased efficiency, the cooperative would increase the vol­
ume of fish available to consumers from the same harvest level. 
The results of the cooperative were impressive. As under ITQ 
programs, "more efficient operators leased shares from less effi­
cient ones" and firms reduced the number of fishing vessels in the 
fishery.175 The recovery rate - the amount of saleable product re­
covered from fish - increased substantially. Indeed, the four firms 
produced over five million pounds more food from the same volume 
of fish caught - often of higher quality - while using fewer 
boats. 17o At the same time, by-catch declinedJ77 To enforce the 
arrangement and prevent cheating, the cooperative contracted 
with a fishery harvest monitoring service, which also enabled fed­
168. [d. 
169. [d. at 1. Sullivan uses the term individual fishing quota (lFQ). 
170. See id. at 4-6 . 
171. Ramsey, supra note 166; see Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5. 
172. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5. 
173. Ramsey, supra note 166. 
174. Id. 
175. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5. 
176. J. Leblanc, United States' Fishery Cooperatives: Rationalizing Fisheries 
Through Privately Negotiated Contracts , in FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPER 404/ 
2-USE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (Ross Shotton ed., Food & 
Agric. Org. 2000). 
177. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 5; Leblanc, supra note 176. 
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eral regulators to increase the accuracy of the seasonal catch 
allocation. 178 
The PWCC was so successful that it spawned another private 
harvesting agreement in the North Pacific pollock fishery, the Pol­
lock Conservation Cooperative.179 This development was facili­
tated by the American Fisheries Act,180 which subdivided the 
pollock fishery much like the whiting fishery was divided.18l 
Again the Justice Department declined to prosecute, citing the po­
tential pro-competit ive impacts of the cooperative.182 In 2002, a 
cooperative in Alaska's Chignik salmon fishery began as well.183 
Creation of the whiting and pollock harvesting cooperatives 
was facilitated by the imposition of total catch limits in each fish­
ery. With fishery output already limited by regulation, antitrust 
enforcers had little reason to fear that market allocation among 
fishery participants would reduce consumer welfare by further re­
ducing output and increasing prices. Indeed, by eliminating the 
"race to fish ," the market allocation agreements had the opposite 
effect . The cooperatives also produce some ecological benefit, most 
notably the reduction in bycatch and greater seasonal balance in 
fishing patterns. Cooperatives also have some advantages over 
quasi-property rights schemes in that they are "unencumbered" by 
the sorts of restrictions on concentration, leasing, and transfer that 
are imposed on ITQ regimes.184 
Congress could further facilit ate private ordering in fisheries 
by providing explicit statutory authorization for the creation of 
fishing cooperatives or conservation associations. This could be 
achieved either by enacting a blanket antit rust exemption or by 
expanding the limited exemption provided by the Fisherman's Col­
178. Sullivan, supra note 156, at 6. 
179. AT-SEA PROCESSORS Ass'N, PRELIMINARY AsSESSMENT OF THE POLLOCK 
CONSERVATION COOPERATIVE (Dec. 1999), at ht tp://www.atsea.org (on fi le with 
author). 
180. Pub. 1. No. 105-~77 , 112 Stat. 2681-616 (1998). 
181. This h istory is summarized in Matulich et a!., supra note 69, at 2-4. 
182. Press Release, United States Departmen t of J ustice, 00-86, J ust ice De­
partment Approves Proposal by the Pollock Conservation Cooperative (Feb. 29, 
2000) , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2000/February/086at.h tm. 
183. Wesley Loy, Co-op Revolutionizes Chignik Fishery, ANCHORAGE DAILY 
NEWS, J une 22, 2002, at D1. 
184. Keith R. Criddle & Seth Macinko, A Requiem for the IFQ in U.S. Fisheries, 
24 MARINE POL'y 461, 465 (:(·000) 
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lective Marketing Act.l85 An alternative would be to create a 
mechanism whereby NMFS or regional fishery management coun­
cils could authorize .the creation and operation of a fishing 
cooperative. 
The devolut ion of management authority from government 
agencies to resource user organizations has proven successful in 
New Zealand, where management responsibility for the southern 
scallop fishery has been devolved to the Challenger Scallop En­
hancement Company (CSEC), a private association of quota hold­
ers within the fishery.186 
The New Zealand government created formal ITQs in the fish­
ery in the mid-1990s.187 The creation of property rights in the fish­
ery through the ITQs reduced the t ransaction costs associated with 
creating a collective self-governing institution for the fishery.188 
Once the ITQs were allocated, the quota holders organized into the 
CSEC to facilitate stock enhancement efforts, such as seeding, and 
to develop harvesting rules.189 Among other things, the CSEC de­
termines where and when fishing can occur, manages enhance­
ment efforts, supports research , and collects funds from its 
members.190 The CSEC conducts an annual survey of scallop 
stocks and oversees a shellfish safety program.191 Merely creating 
ITQs or other property rights in fishery stocks would facilitate the 
formation of similar entities in U.S. fisheries. Yet more is possible. 
The CSEC not only coordinates fishing activities and supports 
enforcement like the pollock and whiting cooperatives, it also has 
management responsibilities that would be prohibited under U.S. 
law. Most notably, the CSEC has de facto responsibility for setting 
185. 15 U.S.C. § 521 (1997) . 
186. Basil M. H. Sharp, New Zealand's Fisheries Management 162 (unpub­
lished manuscript, on file with author) (prepared for PERC's Thirteenth Political 
Economy Forum "Evolving Property Rights in Marine Fisheries" at Big Sky, 
Montana). 
187. [d. at 150. 
188. See Townsend, supra note 1, a t 257-60; Anthony Scott, Obstacles to Fish­
r ry Self-Government , 8 MARINE R E OURCE ECON. 187, 196-97 (1993). 
189. Sharp, supra note 186, a t 162; Townsend, supra note 1, a t 247. 
190. Sharp, supra note 186, at 162. 
191. Townsend, supra note 1, at 249 (stating that the CSEC "has taken on the 
full range of activi ties tha t many presume only a government can manage: shell­
fish safety, research, stock enhancement, management and enforcement of catch 
levels, and resolution of gear conflicts among fisheries") . 
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harvest levels and quotas,192 The New Zealand Minister of Fisher­
ies still sets a total allowable catch for the scallop fishery, but this 
level is set well above the level that is fished. 193 Through the 
CSEC, scallop quota owners lease a substantial portion of their 
quota holdings back to the CSEC where they are held and not 
fished.1 94 In other words, the CSEC has taken responsibility for 
controlling the harvest level by limiting the output of its members 
below those levels set by the government. 195 Such action would be 
a per se violation of antitrust law in the United States.196 
If legislative or administrative measures to facilitate private 
ordering in marine fisheries are not forthcoming, it is possible that 
cooperative associations may find relief in court. Courts often rec­
ognize that agreements in restraint of trade serve additional pur·· 
poses, such as the need to overcome free-rider problems or produce 
off-setting efficiencies. 197 In principle, there is no reason why such 
analysis should not accommodate conservation efforts. Specifi­
cally, there is no reason why the conservation benefits of a collec­
tive entity should not be weighed against its potential anti­
competitive conduct. This is particularly true in the case of conser­
vation, where what antitrust condemns is that which conservation 
requires. As Bruce Yandle, a former economist at the Federal 
Trade Commission observes, "cooperative efforts by fishermen to 
restrict access to a commons, thereby sustaining a fishery, serve 
the joint interests of the fishermen and consumers."19R 
If nothing else, increasing globalization of fish markets and in­
creased competition from aquaculture should reduce antitrust 
scrutiny. Concerns about anti-competitive conduct are at their na­
dir when those engaged in allegedly anti-competitive conduct do 
not have market power. If shrimpers in the Gulf of Mexico, for 
example, engage in collusive behavior to restrict their catch and 
shift the shrimp harvest to later in the season, this is only a con­
192. Townsend, supra note 1, at 247; see Sharp, supra note 186, at 162. 
193. Townsend, supra note 1, at 247. 
194. Id. 
195. See id. 
196. It is worth noting that the CSEC needed to obtain an exemption from lim­
its on aggregate quota holdings designed to limit concentration within the indus­
try.ld. 
197. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 28-32 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing 
the beneficial effects of monopolies in cases with defendants who are "benign 
cartels"). 
198. Yandle, supra note 153, at 49. 
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cern if they have the ability to increase market prices for shrimp. 
If, however, shrimp harvested from other locations competes di­
rectly with Gulf shrimp, the ability of the Gulf shrimpers to re­
strict market output and increase market prices is limited, and 
antitrust concerns should abate. "In the absence of government 
sanctions that block competitive entry, it is difficult to see how re­
gional fishing associations . . . could effectively cartelize major 
product markets."199 With global markets, fisheries will compete 
with one another - and with other food sources - for market 
share.20o 
The development of fisher cooperatives in several fisheries, 
however modest, illustrates that some private ordering will occur 
so long as there are substantial benefits to be gained therefrom. In 
other words, where the costs of private ordering are less than the 
costs of maintaining the status quo in fisheries, some amount of 
private ordering should occur. Addressing legal obstacles to such 
developments, such as antitrust law's prohibition on collective ar­
rangements that reduce fishery consumption, will further facilitate 
private ordering in marine fisheries by reducing the costs of such 
activities. So, too, would clarifying the legal rights and entitle­
ments of existing and potential resource users through the creation 
of ITQs or some other property-based management system. Such 
institutional reforms should improve fishery management by cre­
ating greater opportunities for those most dependent upon marine 
resources to engage in stewardship and conservation efforts. 
VI. C ONCLUSION 
Conservmg marine resources requires controlling access and 
reducing output. At issue is who, or what institution, should es­
tablish and enforce such controls. This is a question of institu­
tional capacity as much as it is the inherent desirability of one 
institutional framework over another. The American legal tradi­
tion may disfavor property rights in wildlife, yet it may be the case 
that reliance upon government regulation to conserve some livi~g 
marine resources is to condemn them to exhaustion. 
Given the historical failure of government regulation to ensure 
sustainable utilization of fisheries, it is puzzling that existing law 
199. Id. 
200. Edwardb, supra note 34, a t 266. 
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implicitly assumes that a politically influenced regulatory agency 
or a management council is a better means of controlling output 
than a self-interested owner, whether an individual, an associa­
tion, or some other collective institution. A wealth of research on 
natural resource management, including fishery management, 
suggests that private owners will engage in better stewardship 
than the political process. 201 
Environmental problems are typically characterized as result­
ing from "market failure" - a failure of private institutions to safe­
guard environmental resources. Yet the experience with marine 
resources suggests that "government failure" or "political failure" 
would be a more accurate diagnosis of the problem. It is not that 
private institutions have failed, it is that we have failed to have 
private institutions, and government policy is sometimes the 
cause. 202 Moreover, the failure of private institutions to produce 
"optimal" results in some, even many, instances does not mean 
that political management will produce better outcomes;203 "the 
relevant question is whether private ordering reaches a result that 
is superior to the result public ordering reaches."204 
Existing legal institutions need to leave room for private insti­
tutions to operate. As Ellickson noted at the close ofOrder Without 
Law, "lawmakers who are unappreciative of the social conditions 
that foster informal cooperation are likely to create a world in 
which there is both more law and less order ."205 Private ordering 
will not solve every conservation concern - not even every fishery 
problem - but it could well supplement government efforts, if not 
replace them. Given the plight of marine fisher ies, it would be 
folly to ignore a conservation tool as potentially powerful as private 
ordering. 
201. See infra Part II; see also Smith, supra note 16. See generally TERRY L. 
ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPlTALISTS: DOING GOOD WHILE DOING 
WELL (1997). 
202. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Conclusion: Environmental Policy at the Crossroads , in 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS 177, 192 (Michael S. 
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
203. See Demsetz, supra note 44, at 1-2. 
204. Macey, supra note 85, a t 1141. 
205. ELLICKSON, supra note 78, at 286. 
